Sanctions Designation Analysis for February 26, 2026 Nicaragua Designations under E.O. 13581

OFAC Nicaragua Designations — Ferrari & Associates
Ferrari & Associates
OFAC SANCTIONS ANALYSIS
Executive Order 13851 (as amended by E.O. 14088)
February 26, 2026 | SB0409
Sanctions Analysis

OFAC Nicaragua Designations — February 26, 2026

On February 26, 2026, OFAC designated five Nicaraguan government officials under Executive Order 13851 (as amended by E.O. 14088) for their roles in enabling the Murillo-Ortega dictatorship’s repression. This action represents a rare human rights-based designation by the second Trump administration, whose sanctions priorities have focused overwhelmingly on Iran, counter-narcotics, and counter-terrorism.

Designated Individuals
OfficialPositionBasis for Designation
Denis Membreno RivasDirector, Financial Analysis Unit (UAF)Weaponizing AML/CFT systems against political opponents
Aldo Martin Saenz UlloaDeputy Director, UAFCo-led UAF since 2012; same weaponization of AML/CFT
Johana Vanessa Flores JimenezMinister of LaborLabor rights abuses and unfair conditions of competition
Celia Margarita Reyes OchoaDeputy Dir. General, TELCORRegime surveillance and communications control apparatus
Leonel Jose Gutierrez LopezHead, DICIM (Military Intelligence)Internal/external surveillance and repression coordination

Legal Basis: All five designated as “officials of the Government of Nicaragua…at any time on or after January 10, 2007” — the broadest available criterion under E.O. 13851. Standard blocking language applies; the 50% Rule extends to owned entities.

2025 Sanctions Landscape
1,322
Total SDN
Designations (2025)
~75%
Iran-Related
Designations
226
Transnational
Crime Targets
5
Nicaragua
Designees

Source: CNAS “Sanctions by the Numbers: 2025 Year in Review” (January 2026)

Commonalities with Administration Policy

Western Hemisphere focus — aligns with posture toward Venezuela, Colombia, Cuba, Mexico
Targeting individual government officials — consistent with sanctioning named regime actors
Bipartisan continuity — E.O. 13851 (Trump 2018), expanded by E.O. 14088 (Biden 2022)
Secondary sanctions warning — standard language warning foreign financial institutions

Distinctions from Administration Policy

Human rights & democracy basis — not CT/CN authority; outlier given broad deprioritization
Modest scale — 5 individuals vs. 600+ Iran, 226 TCO, 151 drug-trafficking targets
No military force or tariffs — pure sanctions action, departing from “all-tools” approach
Not transactional — pure accountability action without deal-making or diplomatic negotiation

Human Rights Deprioritization: In April 2025, the Trump administration delisted a Biden-era Global Magnitsky designee (a Hungarian official). The administration’s only Global Magnitsky designation — Brazilian Justice Alexandre de Moraes (July 2025) — was itself delisted in December 2025. The West Bank sanctions program was terminated on Inauguration Day.

Key Takeaways & Practitioner Implications
🏛

Active Program Status

E.O. 13851 continues to generate designations despite deprioritization of human rights sanctions
Bipartisan consensus on Ortega-Murillo regime remains intact across administrations
Pending legislation (HR 7055) would further expand Nicaragua sanctions authorities

Broad Designation Standard

Widest criterion used: any current or former GoN official since January 10, 2007
Any current or recent Nicaraguan government official is potentially at risk of designation
No requirement to demonstrate specific misconduct beyond holding government office
🛡

Secondary Sanctions Risk

Press release explicitly warns foreign financial institutions of correspondent account restrictions
Mirrors secondary sanctions language used in Iran and other priority programs
Foreign banks must assess exposure to Nicaraguan government officials and owned entities

Delisting Pathway

OFAC includes standard removal language: “the ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish”
Parties directed to OFAC guidance on filing petitions for removal from SDN List
Delisting typically requires 6+ months; depends on petition quality and policy context